If you look back at England’s qualification for major tournaments over the past 50 years, the times when they’ve failed are etched into the national psyche like a rusty needle.
Many will point to Poland at Wembley in 1973. They’ll also think about Croatia at Wembley in 2007, Denmark at Wembley in 1983 and the Netherlands in Rotterdam in 1993.
But there is another game which cost England a place at a major championship but is less thought about.
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The other games mentioned were either the final game of the group or the penultimate. This match was smack-bang in the middle of the campaign, yet it had just as much of an impact on their failure to qualify.
The match? Italy v England in Rome in November 1976.
To set the scene, this was before the fall of the Berlin Wall, before the break-up of the Soviet Union and when all the Balkan nations made up one country, Yugoslavia. Therefore, there were 31 entrants in qualifying for Argentina ’78 whereas 55 nations took part in the campaign for Qatar 2022.
There were nine groups in qualifying. Four with four teams, five with just three. England had been drawn in a group of three for 1974 and defeat in Poland largely sealed their fate. This time they were in a group of four, along with Italy. However, there was still little margin for error as two of Europe’s minnows, Finland and Luxembourg were in with them. Both Italy and England were expected to breeze past those countries and so the meetings against each other were likely to be crucial.
Everyone agreed goal difference was likely to be a significant factor.
The game wasn’t broadcast live in either country. It was played on a Wednesday afternoon and British TV wasn’t set up to accommodate unusual kick-off times. In Italy, economic concerns were such the government asked the broadcaster, RAI not to show the match live in case people took the day off to watch it. Different times.
Italy
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Italy were coached by Enzo Bearzot. To be more precise they were co-coached.
As a player, Bearzot had an 18-year career with four different clubs, including two spells with Inter and Torino. He won a couple of Serie B titles, but nothing else. When his playing career ended he was assistant coach at Torino for a brief period, before beginning work with the Italian FA. He was the U23 coach and then assistant to Ferrucio Valcareggi during the 1974 World Cup in West Germany. That tournament was a huge disappointment for a nation which finished second to the great Brazil side in 1970. They only won one of their group matches, against Haiti, and went home early.
Italy replaced Valcareggi with Fulvio Bernardini and Bearzot remained with the U23 side. Then in September 1975, Bearzot was installed as technical commissioner with Bernardini overseeing all the national teams. Hence, they were co-coached.
Their first two matches together were goalless draws but then in November they beat the Dutch, 1-0 in Rome. Fabio Capello scored the only goal of the game against a side containing Ruud Krol, Wim Suurbier, Wim Jansen, Willy and Rene van der Kerkhof. Frans Thiijssen also played in that match.
They were unbeaten in six matches when they came up against England in the Bicentennial Tournament in the States. After leading 2-0 they conceded three times in the second half, handing England a crucial confidence boost.
Confidence, because the two nations already knew they’d be up against each other for the ’78 qualifiers.
After the England defeat, they were once again beaten 1-4 by Brazil. But back in Europe, they beat Romania, Denmark and Yugoslavia before opening their qualifying campaign with a 4-1 win in Luxembourg.
By then England had played taken part in two of their qualifying matches.
England
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They won comfortably, 4-1 in Helsinki against Finland. Manager Don Revie was favouring a 4-3-3 formation. Ever the fastidious tactician, he was known for his detailed dossiers on opponents. Revie had been in charge of one of the finest teams the English league had ever seen, Leeds United.
He was in the hot seat at Elland Road for 13 years. Within a couple of years of taking over, he got them out of Division Two. Four years later the League Cup arrived, and so did the Inter-Cities Fairs Cup (the forerunner to the UEFA Cup & the Europa League) and then the big one, the league title.
In the 10 years they were in the First Division under Revie they never finished lower than fourth with seven finishes in the top two. Yet they only won the league twice. They reached the FA Cup Final four times, and yet again they only won it once.
Revie cultivated a very definite ‘no one likes us, we don’t care’ culture at Leeds. In essence, his team didn’t change all that much over the years with many of his squad remaining at the club year after year.
Another way of looking at this is that he didn’t trust many players.
When The FA decided to ditch Sir Alf Ramsey after England failed to qualify for West Germany 1974, Revie was probably the best-qualified candidate. Either way, they caused controversy by not interviewing anyone else for the job.
Things began well. Four of his first five matches were qualifiers for Euro ’76. They won three and drew the other. In between these games was one of England’s finest results when World Champions, West Germany were well beaten 2-0 at Wembley.
Revie installed Alan Ball as captain and the team seemed rejuvenated. Ball’s tenure was an unbeaten one. It culminated in a 5-1 demolition of Scotland at Wembley. Alongside Ball in midfield was QPR’s Gerry Francis. There was a real positivity about the national side’s prospects.
Then for some reason, Revie ripped up his plans and went in another direction. Ball was discarded and not in a way which pleased England’s World Cup winner. Revie never told him.
Francis was installed as skipper and things looked promising until defeat in Bratislava to Czechoslovakia put paid to any hopes of Euro Finals. The Czechs eventually won the competition but at the time it was a disappointing loss.
This was followed by a drab 1-1 draw in Lisbon and the honeymoon period was over.
Colin Bell and Malcolm MacDonald followed Ball onto the international scrap heap. The manager’s treatment of MacDonald was another mystery. He made no secret of not wanting the player in his team and only selecting him because the press were clamouring for it. He told the player as much when MacDonald reported for duty. Even when MacDonald equalled the goalscoring record with all five in a win over Cyprus, the boss never even shook his hand.
The British International Championships ended with a smarting defeat at Hampden Park and the public were not amused.
Fortunately, the summer of ’76 gave Revie a chance to get away from the flack he was receiving at home. England were invited to compete in the Bicentennial Cup in the United States. They equipped themselves pretty well. Beaten by a late goal against Brazil, they then comfortably beat Team America, a side composed of foreign players playing in the North American Soccer League including Bobby Moore, Pelé and Tommy Smith.
In between those matches was that crucial meeting with Italy and overturning a 0-2 deficit to win.
By now Revie employed three up front. Most clubs were still employing 4-4-2 or 4-2-4 but Revie preferred Channon and Keegan either side of a central striker.
They began their World Cup qualifying campaign with a 4-1 win in Finland with all three strikers scoring.
The 1975-76 domestic season had seen QPR come within 15 minutes of winning the league championship for the first time. They were inspired by captain Gerry Francis. But once the season was over and the Finland game was won, he was never seen in an England shirt again.
There was disquiet at home with the amount of changes the manager was making. He’d never named the same XI twice. He had a mistrust of the creative ‘maverick’ which 70’s English football was full of.
Alan Hudson’s first cap was a sparkling display in the win over West Germany. His next appearance was in the 5-0 win over Cyprus. We never saw him again.
Frank Worthington made just one substitute appearance, in Revie’s second match and he was binned. Charlie George got his chance in a Wembley draw with the Republic of Ireland just after the Finland victory, and that was his chance gone.
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QPR’s Stan Bowles had been given his England debut in Ramsey’s last match in charge. By the time this Italy game came around, he’d only added two more appearances to that. He was a key figure in his club’s league title attempt, yet Revie never called upon his services during that season.
In October 1976, Finland arrived at Wembley. Remember that mention of goal difference? Many were expecting England to build on the 4-1 win from Helsinki. Man City’s Dennis Tueart scored his first goal for his country inside the opening five minutes and things appeared on track.
But they failed to build on this and when Finland levelled things early in the second half there were nerves around the place. Joe Royle eventually won it but the 2-1 scoreline was likely to favour the Italians rather than England.
This was the backdrop as England boarded the plane for the trip to Rome.
England was still scarred from the failure to qualify for 1974. Alf Ramsey, hero in 1966 but increasingly accused of being out of touch by 1973, was criticised for his selection for the Poland game at Wembley. But that team had just put seven past Austria less than a month earlier. So Ramsey had every reason that was the team to beat Poland and get England to the World Cup. The fact they had 36 shots on goal, 26 corners, hit the woodwork twice and had four shots cleared off the line, would suggest he wasn’t too wrong.
Compare this to Revie three years later.
Emlyn Hughes was recalled after an absence of 18 months. Liverpool were flying high at the top of the table, yet Kevin Keegan, rather than club captain Hughes, was now Revie’s fourth captain. Revie made six changes from the previous qualifying game just a month earlier.
This was where the thinking became muddled. For a man so meticulous in his planning, this seemed ominously out of character.
He changed both full-backs. Against Finland, he had Colin Todd and Kevin Beattie at right and left-back. Yet both were more suited to playing in central defence for their clubs. So the fact he brought in QPR’s Dave Clement on the right and Ipswich’s captain, Mick Mills on the left, made more sense. Both were traditional full-backs although Clement had only picked up three caps before this game.
In the centre of defence against Finland, he had Phil Thompson and Brian Greenhoff. Now he chose Emlyn Hughes and Roy McFarland, both club captains. McFarland was seen as one of the finest centre-backs of his generation and was making his 28th appearance for his country. It would be his last.
Hughes was earning his 41st cap, but as mentioned earlier he’d not pulled on an England shirt for 18 months.
McFarland had won two league titles with Derby County in 1972 and 1975. Hughes had just won his second league title with Liverpool, as well as captaining them to the UEFA Cup in May.
He had Ray Clemence in goal. He was in the same Liverpool team which had won the UEFA Cup and League Championship in May. Like Hughes, he was part of the Liverpool side which had won the league in 1973 too.
So far so good as Revie went for experience with his back five.
It was in midfield where things got crazy.
Against Finland, he used Ray Wilkins and Trevor Brooking in the centre. Both creative players, not known for their tackling. Brooking had been part of the West Ham team which reached the European Cup-Winners’ Cup Final six months earlier. Wilkins was still at Chelsea, then a Second Division club. It was his third cap. For width against the Finns, he employed Manchester City’s Dennis Tueart. Also earning his third cap, he scored England’s first goal.
Yet in Rome, he chose to use Trevor Cherry and Greenhoff in central midfield. Cherry was one of Revie’s players at Leeds and could play in midfield or defence. He could be described as a worker rather than a creator. The same could be said of Greenhoff who was also more suited to defensive duties for Manchester United.
He then used Brooking on the left. A silky, classy player, Brooking was equally adept with his left foot and his right. But sticking him out wide restricted the options England might have had if he’d been back in the centre.
Then it was up front Revie got far too funky. He plumped for Mick Channon on the right and Kevin Keegan on the left. This was to be expected. Channon had scored twice against Italy in New York in the summer and was also on the scoresheet in Finland.
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Keegan, captain for the third time, had scored twice in Helsinki. He was in great form for club and country.
In the centre of attack, Revie had alternated between Manchester City’s Joe Royle and Manchester United’s Stuart Pearson for the previous eight games.
Inexplicably, he chose QPR’s Stan Bowles for the centre-forward role. Bowles, one of English football’s most exciting players, was used exclusively in midfield by his club. it could be argued QPR may never have come so close to winning the title without him.
Mercurial and unpredictable, he seemed the epitome of a player Revie would not trust. Yet here he was wearing the number nine shirt with the job of scoring goals. It was his fourth cap but his first for two and a half years.
At QPR, Bowles was playing under Dave Sexton. One of the most innovative coaches of his time, he adopted a style of play with three forwards operating in a very fluid system. Bowles, Don Givens and Dave Thomas swapped positions regularly and were well supported by midfield creators like Gerry Francis and Don Masson. But Francis was injured during this time, otherwise he would’ve been an ideal option for both Bowles and England.
There was little doubt amongst England fans that Bowles should be in the team, and hopefully alongside Channon and Keegan, he would flourish. But he would be marked by Claudio Gentile.
English football was still very fond of using a ‘big number nine’ as often the tactic would be to lump it up for him to cause chaos in the opposing area, then have willing runners to pick up any knockdowns.
With two ‘workers’ in midfield, it seemed likely this was the tactic to be used. Yet Bowles was completely the wrong type of player to be targeted in this way.
Neither Royle or Pearson were injured. Pearson made the squad, Royle didn’t. Pearson scored for United the weekend before and was named as a substitute. Seems odd why he didn’t stick with players he clearly felt had been good enough for some time.
The top scorer in the First Division at that time was Ipswich’s Trevor Whymark. He’d just scored four against West Brom at the weekend before this match. He was uncapped at full level but had made numerous U23 appearances. Of course, this would’ve been a gamble to hand him his first cap in such an important fixture, yet Revie decided Bowles up front was far less of a gamble.
Close behind Whymark in the goalscoring tables was another uncapped player, Bob Latchford and also a previously discarded choice, Malcolm MacDonald. Supermac was now at Arsenal having just moved there from Newcastle and had made an immediate impression. He was the First Division’s top scorer in 1975 and third highest a year later. Despite all this Revie just wouldn’t pick him.
One other candidate would’ve been Trevor Francis. He burst onto the scene as a 16-year-old at Birmingham City. By this time he was 22 years old and still rated as a hot prospect. He was fourth behind MacDonald in the goalscoring list the previous season. Revie gave him his debut for the next international when the Dutch came to Wembley and ran rings round their opponents.
Watching the game back, it was clear where England’s problems were from the start. It was through the middle. Cherry and Greenhoff offered no attacking threat, created nothing and Bowles was marked out of the game, seemingly unsure of his role.
If we focus on the midfield pair for a moment. This wasn’t Hoddle employing Ince and Batty to break up attacks. Italy just kept it wide with Causio and Antognoni and rarely attacked through the middle. It was probably 30 minutes before Greenhoff played a forward pass. Cherry got involved in some niggly fouls, but that was just what the Italians wanted. Why try and play like Italians when they’re used to it, you’re not? Cherry was dependable, loyal and steady. Bremner or Giles he was not.
Generally, England tried to play through the middle. But when I say ‘played through’ it should probably mean bypassed the midfield by lumping it long.
But without a big striker capable and with the ability, to hold the ball up, bundle defenders off the ball, the tactic was hopeless.
Keegan’s game at Liverpool was very much centred around his partnership with John Toshack. Tosh was the big striker who’d win the headers and Keegan would pick up the knockdowns. Keegan would often come short to offer an option, to drag a defender out of position to create space. But this wasn’t Bowles’ game. It was Royle’s, Latchford’s and MacDonald’s, but not Bowles.
Channon and Keegan had a good relationship off and on the pitch at this time, so it would’ve been more effective to have the two link together.
When Italy attacked they used the flanks. When they didn’t have the ball they squeezed the play into the middle. England never got the ball out wide effectively enough so Channon ended up more as a central forward rather than out wide.
In the first half, Italy had the better of the chances. Italy’s keeper, Dino Zoff didn’t have a save to make. England came closest from a couple of free-kicks out wide but McFarland and Channon either couldn’t get a decent header in or it went wide.
Italy were dangerous on a couple of occasions. Then with eight minutes of the first half to go they won a free-kick in a fairly central position about 20 yards out. Causio passed it for Antognoni to have a shot. Keegan burst out from the wall and the Italian’s shot deflected off his leg, wrong-footing Clemence and Italy had the lead. 1-0.
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As the half came towards an end there was a move which seemed to sum up England’s impotence in attack. Brooking beat a couple of players wide on the left, and found Greenhoff in acres of space in the middle. For about the only time in the half, Greenhoff surged forward with the ball. Bowles dropped short and the Manchester United man decided to play a one-two with him. But once he received the ball back, Greenhoff appeared to have no idea what to do next. So he attempted a rather weak shot with the outside of his right foot which, somehow, Italy kicked out for a corner.
It would’ve been far better if Greenhoff and Bowles had swapped positions as the QPR man had far more idea of how to create something than Greenhoff.
Worse was to follow for the visitors. Bowles took the corner, swinging it into the six-yard area. Channon got up and was challenged by Zoff. The ball bounced out to an England player unmarked. It was Greenhoff. Just earlier it appeared he didn’t have a left foot, whereas this time he let the ball bounce then volleyed it left-footed. It disappeared over the bar and onto the running track behind the goal.
The image of Channon with his head in his hands as one of three England players standing in the six-yard box waiting for Greenhoff to feed them was a sign of the frustration of how things just weren’t working.
None of this was Greenhoff’s fault. He’d spent the last year as Martin Buchan’s centre-back partner at Old Trafford. The fact he missed just two matches of United’s season shows you how reliable he was. But Revie had McFarland and Hughes for their defensive qualities.
At half-time it must’ve been clear to the England manager his system wasn’t working. A simple switch of bringing Pearson on for Greenhoff and dropping Bowles deeper into midfield would surely have been the ideal change. But Revie stuck with his plan.
It can hardly be surprising for the return fixture a year later, Ron Greenwood, who’d replaced Revie as manager, decided to employ two wingers, Steve Coppell and Peter Barnes. This was clearly in a bid to stretch the Italians, and it worked. But in this game England just played into their hands.
Early in the second half Brooking finally got clear down the left. But not being a natural winger, instead of taking the full-back on and getting to the bye-line, which was a typical tactic for English teams back then. He clipped it into the area where Bowles was reasonably unmarked. He seemed a little lost as to what to do. So he turned and hit the ball straight against a defender when Keegan and Channon were better placed towards the back post.
The second half was very stop-start. Obviously, this suited the home side. There was an amusing moment when Clement was challenged by Graziani and lost his right boot. He then chased after the Italian and tackled him with his boot-less foot. Unbelievably, the referee gave a free-kick to the home side!
With about 20 minutes to go England had a promising situation as Greenhoff was in plenty of space and able to bring the ball forward. It is interesting how a team so dedicated to man-to-man marking just left Greenhoff alone. Into the Italian half, he intelligently gave the ball to Keegan to try and create something.
Keegan eased past Capello and with a move which we would come to see a lot in that stadium the following May, he ran with the ball towards the area. He then played it out wide to Channon on the right and continued his run.
Channon immediately played a lovely ball towards the near post. But unfortunately, it was too early for Keegan to have got there. Two England players converged, Bowles looked to be the ideal option but once again Greenhoff was the one who got to it and blasted it over.
It was a great chance. England were finally free to create something as the Italians began to look tired and the game looked stretched. Perhaps Revie could consider himself unlucky as the best chances his team had all fallen to a player unaccustomed to his role.
Into the last quarter-of-an-hour and England were still pressing for the equaliser. They forced a couple of corners and on the second one, Zoff punched the ball clear to allow Capello to run unchallenged deep into England’s half.
England looked to have defended the opportunity but Benetti picked it up in the centre circle. He looked to his left where Causio was. He played it up to him and continued his run. Causio played a one-two with him with a gorgeous back-flick and Benetti was into the left side of the area. Benetti, one of seven Juventus players then looked up and saw Bettega on the penalty spot. He floated it to him and the Italian number 11 headed it past Clemence. The ball was played slightly behind him so he had to put a lot of power into the header, giving the England keeper little chance of stopping.
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It was 2-0 and that was that.
What stands out from that goal is that Bettega was unmarked and had time to steady himself and get his body shape right for the header. No England player ever had that luxury at the other end. Italy defended so well.
England immediately stormed forward but no one was able to get a clear shot on goal until the ball broke loose on the right of the area and who should be free to have a shot? Yes, Brian Greenhoff. This time he did manage to find the target but Zoff pushed it over.
From the corner, Channon couldn’t make an impression at the near post and the ball came out to Cherry on the edge of the area. It bounced and Cherry hit it first time but Zoff saved. The Italian keeper put in a rather theatrical dive when he could’ve just stood where he was and caught it.
It’s ironic the only two instances where England forced Zoff to make a save were from Cherry and Greenhoff.
Wednesday 17th November 1977, Stadio Olimpico, Rome, 70,718
ITALY (1) 2 (Antognoni 36)
ENGLAND (0) 0
ITALY: Zoff (Juventus{; Cuccureddu (Juventus), Gentile (Juventus), Facchetti (Inter), Tardelli (Juventus); Causio (Juventus), Capello (Milan), Benetti (Juventus), Antognoni (Fiorentina); Graziani (Torino), Bettega (Juventus)
ENGLAND: Clemence (Liverpool); Clement (QPR), [Beattie (Ipswich)] Hughes (Liverpool), McFarland (Derby), Mills (Ipswich); Cherry (Leeds), Greenhoff (Man Utd), Brooking (West Ham); Channon (Southampton), Bowles (QPR), Keegan (Liverpool)
Italy had landed a crucial blow to England’s qualification hopes. Of course, if England were to beat them in the return at Wembley then they would cancel out each other’s result. But the manner of the victory put this in doubt at the time.
England’s next qualifier was Luxembourg at Wembley the following March. Revie made another six changes, with Trevor Francis and Joe Royle playing. England won 5-0 to give them a slight advantage over Italy’s result against the same opposition.
In June Italy beat Finland 3-0 in Helsinki. At the same time England were in South America for a tour in the hope of getting acclimatised for the Finals the year after. Three draws against Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay wasn’t too bad. But then everything was thrown up in the air.
Unbeknownst to his employer, Revie negotiated a contract with the UAE and he was off.
The FA replaced him with former West Ham boss, Ron Greenwood. In October their campaign was virtually over as they struggled to beat Luxembourg, 2-0 and three days later Italy thumped Finland, 6-1. England had a mountain to climb. The 2-0 win over Italy at Wembley wasn’t anywhere near enough and Italy eased past Luxembourg in the final game to book their flight to Argentina.
As England equalled Italy for points they could blame lack of goals in other games, but it’s fairly clear they gave themselves a lot of work to do from the way they were set up in Rome early on in the group.
